Missing the Peace Train in 2006: Economic and Political Dynamics of India Pakistan Hostility? by Mamoon, Dawood
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Missing the Peace Train in 2006:
Economic and Political Dynamics of
India Pakistan Hostility?
Dawood Mamoon
University of Islamabad (A Bahria Town Project)
3 October 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81759/
MPRA Paper No. 81759, posted 3 October 2017 14:48 UTC
1Missing the Peace Train in 2006: Economic and Political 
Dynamics of India Pakistan Hostility?
By Dawood Mamoon
Dean and Professor
University of Islamabad (A Bahria Town Project)
(Harvard Business School Affiliate: 2013-2017)
(George Mason University Affiliate: 2016-2018)
(Member: World Economic Survey Expert Group)
Abstract:
 The paper discusses the dynamics of peace initiatives made by Pakistan in 2006 and their importance 
in changing the regional dynamics in favour of increased economic cooperation in the light of the study 
undertaken by Murshed and Mamoon (2007) which has analysed the multiple determinants of conflict 
between India and Pakistan. The paper highlights the importance of peace in the region especially for 
Pakistan where the development potential of the country have been stifled greatly due to a long history of 
political and economic volatility while linking Pakistan’s progress with that of its neighbours through 
conflict mitigation process. The paper also presents the possibility of such dyadic economic and conflict 
trade off in 1990s where India may have utilised hostilities to curtail Pakistani economic potential to 
pressurise Pakistan to forego its support of insurgency in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistani peace 
initiatives in 2006 made the country as a leading factor in South Asia with a valid possibility of 
determining the pace and potential to realise long sought process of regional progress through greater 
integration of interests. However, the tangible response from Indian side was not forthcoming leading to 
loss of opportunities and thus creating a good explanation of Hawkish Indian behaviour 10 years down 
the time line in 2017.
21. Introduction: India Pakistan Conflict Profile
International economic interactions between nations may involve peaceful trade, or it 
could be belligerent with reduced economic interaction. Outright war is just one 
manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the armed peace is equally consistent with 
aggressiveness. India and Pakistan are a case in point. They have had at least four large 
scale military confrontations (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999), but otherwise spend a great 
deal of time in uncompromising posturing vis-à-vis each other. India, in particular, 
frequently accuses Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism in her territory. But occasionally they 
make goodwill gestures, such as sending out peace buses between cities like Delhi and 
Lahore, and agree to cricket tours.  Less frequently, major concessions are made mainly 
by Pakistan, such as current President Musharraf’s willingness to put aside the long 
standing Pakistani demand and United Nations resolution for a plebiscite to settle the 
future of Kashmir.i
Polachek (1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) argue that wars and disputes between 
geographically contiguous states involve greater losses, as more efficient geographically 
proximate trade is displaced. This effect, however, depends on the absence of alternative 
trading partners, who despite greater distance may be equally or more efficient.  India-
Pakistan official trade (as a proportion of Pakistan’s total international trade) steadily 
declined from nearly 20% in the early 1950s, plummeting to almost zero after their war 
in 1965, and has shown some signs of recovery in the 1990s. But it is still below the 
levels of the 1950s, which was shortly after the two nations were separated politically. 
This is despite the fact that India and Pakistan have fairly open economies at the present. 
Though, Pakistan has traditionally been more open than India. 
The opportunity costs of conflict could rise when countries move to higher stages of 
economic development as they have more to lose from conflict, and have more 
resources to negotiate peaceful settlements. For example, the 1990s is considered to be 
a golden decade for India as on average the Indian economy grew at 5-6% annually. 
Pakistan has been growing at an average of 6% for the last 3 to 4 years. Traditionally, 
from the early 1960s up to the early 1990s, Pakistan’s was the faster growing economy 
of the two. In 2006 both countries were in the second most rapidly growing region 
(South Asia) in the world (World Development Indicators, 2006). However the below 
figure also shows that yearly fatality rate (number of deaths in the battle) has been more 
frequent and at historically higher levels for 1990s and the trend continues up till 2002. 
Considering 2006 peace talks between India and Pakistan the fatality levels have 
declined considerably in immediate years.
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                              Does Economic Growth increase the possibility of Peace?
  
Furthermore, the above figure also shows that military expenditures tend to move 
inversely with development (education) expenditure, providing prima facie evidence that 
large military expenditure crowds out development in the social sector. Pakistan’s 
military expenditure is consistently above India’s except in the mid-1960s when India 
had wars with both China and Pakistan. In Pakistan’s case, military expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP has historically been at 5%, but rising during and after its 1965 and 
1971 wars with India to as high as 8%. The average defence expenditure of Pakistan is 
5.5% of GDP in the 1950-2005 period, whereas for India it is about half at 2.8% of 
GDP. Since the 1990s Pakistan’s military expenditure has been falling, and is now at a 
little above 4% of GDP, which represents a historical low. As Indian education 
expenditure rose to 4 % of GDP in the1990s, its defence expenditure fell from nearly 
4% of GDP in the mid-1960s to less than 3% of GDP (it has rarely been below 2% of 
GDP). Pakistan’s public expenditure on education is stagnating at around 2% of GDP. 
An important observation which can be made from the figure is a sharp rise in military 
personnel in recent years despite a fall in proportional defence budgets by both sides 
indicating a rise in militarization by India and Pakistan corresponding to the rise in 
fatality levels. Here militarization in India has increased at a much steeper pace than 
Pakistan which may show Indian security concerns or its hegemonic posture in the 
region. Again note that the figures are available till year 2002. By 2006, due to Pakistan’s 
peace initiatives and its serious efforts to control cross border movement of unwanted 
4personnel at the Line of Control (LOC) has significantly reduced the hostility levels 
which may correspond to a possibility of fall in militarization in the region. 
Nevertheless, as the varying trends discussed above in the determinants of possible 
hostilities suggest: there is more to India-Pakistan conflict than merely Pakistan’s 
political orientation and a comparison of bilateral economic growth rates. This is 
because of the fact that despite high growth rates in India and relatively high democracy 
scores in Pakistan up to 1999, conflict between the countries escalated in the 1990s. By 
contrast, the in 2006 the dictatorial regime in Pakistan with a strong military orientation 
and therefore historically less democratic, was making major unilateral concessions to 
India vis-à-vis their long standing disputes over Kashmir. Could that be related to the 
very impressive growth record in Pakistan?  If anything, conflict between the two 
nations can be best understood in a multivariate framework where the relevant 
variables and processes (economic performance, integration with rest of the world, 
trade between the conflicting nations, military expenditure, democracy, and population) 
are simultaneously taken into account. 
2. Lessons from Quantitative Study by Murshed and Mamoon (2007)
A comprehensive exercise has been carried out by Murshed and Mamoon (2007) to 
objectively analyze the key variables which would help us understand various overlapping 
dynamic factors of India-Pakistan conflict. Such an analysis also helps us to device a 
successful peace strategy based on its economic and security dividends. A simple time 
series model was devised and an evolutionary analysis of India and Pakistan conflict from 
1950 to 2002 was carried out where role of economic development, integration with rest 
of the world, bilateral trade, military expenditure and democracy was analyzed to see how 
these variables may have contributed to the increase or decrease in hostilities between 
these two nations.
Such an exercise is also important to understand the validity of such single point one 
sided explanations which may substantiate the blame game of the one side by presenting 
other side to be more belligerent. For example, it is generally perceived in India that 
strong hold of army and extended dictatorial rules in Pakistan are a significant source of 
hostilities. Whereas Pakistan accuses India to have shown belligerence based on its 
historic hostility dating back to 1948 land dispute in Jammu and Kashmir area which also 
resulted in the first outright war between both countries whereas each side is now 
holding up to a part of the disputed land divided by a line of control while each side has 
been claiming the ownership of the entire area.ii 
Murshed and Mamoon (2007) cover more than 50 years of the India Pakistan history, 
would help us understand whether the dynamics of conflict have been changing since the 
prevalence of initial hostilities and if so how one can positively exploit these changing 
dynamics for making a long term peace strategy. 
The study shows that initial hostilities resulting from Kashmir dispute has significantly 
hampered bilateral trade between the two nations. However, we also find that the 
converse is also true; more trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict and any 
measures to improve the bilateral trade share is a considerable confidence building 
measure. In the short term, greater Indian access to Pakistani markets will help decrease 
hostilities between the two countries; whereas in the long run as the peace is achieved, 
both countries could be exporting more to each other. Lately, there has been a high 
5demand of cheaper Indian raw materials in Pakistani industries. A regional trade 
agreement along the lines of a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) could enable 
freer access to the markets of member countries, and has a high potential for the 
improvement of relations between India and Pakistan on a long term basis. Pakistan and 
India’s degree of openness to world trade is the dominant economic factor in conflict 
resolution. One would imagine that in the counterfactual case of significant mutual 
inward investment, that too would also decrease mutual belligerent tendencies. 
Mamoon and Murshed (2007) also find that Pakistani military expenditure is more 
sensitive to hostilities with its Eastern neighbor whereas Indian military expenditure is 
not entirely Pakistan focused as India, the regional hegemon, has other domestic and 
international concerns to which its defence spending is targeted, besides its disputes with 
Pakistan. Overall, India may have shown more belligerent behavior towards its neighbor 
because of its greater military size. For example, India has unilaterally massed troops on 
Pakistan’s borders in 1951 and 2002. Indeed, there is some reverse causality between 
military proxies and conflict suggesting that Pakistan’s military build ups may be more 
reactive. Furthermore, it is also important to note that Indian part of Kashmir is house to 
India’s largest military contingent active in suppressing insurgency which India accuses 
was actively supported by Pakistani side. Overall military expenditures are still at high 
levels in both countries and are diverting scarce resources away from social development 
spending, such as on education, and poverty reduction. Education spending has been 
shown to be good for both peace and economic progress. Though one should note here 
that optimal level of military expenditure depend on level of economic development. At 
higher levels of economic development military budgets proportional to GDP may fall 
but in absolute terms they may very well rise. In other words, higher the levels of 
economic growth, wider would be the range of optimality in military budgets depending 
on the national and international security situation as more economically vibrant 
countries may also have more challenges to face as they are taking off to the next stage of 
economic prosperity. Thus some times arms race may only indicate the up keeping of 
deterrence between different parties. As in South Asia region, Indian deterrence is 
responding to Chinese defense capabilities where as Chinese deterrence may have been 
focused towards international stakeholders like USA while Pakistan may have to keep its 
deterrence against Indian military capabilities.  While each country may keep its 
minimum self defined threshold level of deterrence, economic cooperation among them 
may bring them closer to each other where countries work with shared stakes to global 
economic well being.  But to reach any such scenario, a country needs to become a 
significant part of global economy and any such status can be achieved party by 
economically integrating with other economies in the region. Thus irrespective of long 
term trends in military budgeting, a country may always consider a smart factor division 
of resources whereby resources are utilized for development in a more effective manner 
which is to suggest that national budgeting for any set of pre defined alternate years 
spend more on social welfare while holding onto proportional defense expenditures to 
some predefined set limits. However any such smart trade offs between development 
and defense cannot happen under heightened hostilities between neighbors or possibility 
of any such. In this context resolution of India Pakistan bilateral issues like Kashmir 
becomes all the more important to achieve sustainable path towards social development 
in the region while both countries may still retain their respective defense niches to 
supplement their  progressing economic and political status regionally and globally.  
In an ideal world democracy between pairs of nations should reduce inter-state hostility 
according to the democratic peace hypothesis; this relationship in our case is present but 
6weak. Peace initiatives, it should be remembered, are not the sole prerogative of 
democracies; they can also be made by countries which are less than perfectly democratic 
out of economic self-interest. Pakistan, at present, is making unilateral concessions on 
many disputed issues with India. Murshed and Mamoon (2007) support the liberal peace 
hypothesis. Economic progress and poverty reduction combined with greater openness 
to international trade in general are more significant drivers of peace between nations like 
India and Pakistan, rather than the independent contribution of a common democratic 
polity. So it is more economic interdependence rather than politics which is likely to 
contribute towards peaceful relations between India and Pakistan in the near future. In 
many ways, our finding echo Polcahek’s (1997) work across several dyads, where it is 
argued that democracies cooperate not because they have common political systems, but 
because their economies are intricately and intensively interdependent. As pointed by 
Hegre (2000), it is at these higher stages of economic development that the contribution 
of common democratic values to peace becomes more salient. Meaningful democracy 
cannot truly function where poverty is acute and endemic, even in ostensible 
democracies such as India. In the final analysis, it may be that democracy itself is an 
endogenous by-product of increased general prosperity, as suggested nearly half a 
century ago by Lipset (1960). Then and only then, will nations be able to fully 
comprehend Angell-Lanes’ (1910) arguments regarding the futility of inter-state conflict.  
In 2006, there was lot of uncertainty on both sides for any significant change in India-
Pakistan relationships despite Pakistani regime’s bold decision to re evaluate its 
traditional stand on Kashmir as well as using bilateral trade as a confidence building 
measure. Some in Pakistan feared that peace initiatives like reducing tariffs for Indian 
goods would mean greater dependency on Indian produce. Taking into account the 
historically high hostility levels between two countries, any peace initiative or 
confidence building measure which leads to more market access to India is viewed with 
scepticism in Pakistan, as many fear that dependence on India may expose Pakistan to 
unnecessary pressures from India, and make it vulnerable to one sided solutions to the 
Kashmir dispute. Our analysis shows that in the long run the dependency on Indian 
cheap goods would actually decline and both countries would end up being equal 
trading partners. Thus more bilateral trade, far from creating any power imbalance 
between India and Pakistan, would equally distribute the gains. Pakistan may also fulfil 
its import needs more from the other developing countries such as China.  
However, Murshed and Mamoon (2007) presents some evidence of competition 
between India and Pakistan to trade with the rest of the world as our findings suggest 
that hostilities with its neighbour has a greater negative effect on Pakistan’s trading 
capabilities when compared to India. Hostilities on its Eastern border areas has over 
the time limited the scope of Pakistani domestic markets to effectively benefit from 
outside competition despite the fact that Pakistan is traditionally a more open economy.  
Though with peace, trade with rest of the world would increase for both countries in 
the short run, in the long run Pakistan would benefit more than India because of its 
greater openness and Indian trade would decline if India does not open up its economy 
further. In 2002, when Pakistan found some breathing space after a decade long 
economic crunch, which the country found itself into since late 1980s due to a 
mounting debt burden amid international sanctions, and as it was managing to benefit 
from international markets as sanctions were lifted for its cooperation in the War on 
Terror, an army build up by the Indian side on Pakistani borders, the largest in history, 
may show that India has used hostilities to offset Pakistan’s economic capabilities. 
Though negative effects for Pakistan have been greater, continued level of heightened 
7hostilities also carried negative effects for India. For example, figure presented above 
show a dip in terms of trade of both countries in year 2002, where Pakistan’s terms of 
trade witnessing a deeper plunge due to Indian military build-up on its borders.  
                                                                           
Murshed and Mamoon (2007) also find that peace is not only good news for the 
economy, it is also good for security capabilities of both nations as decrease in 
hostilities would increase the efficiency of national defence apparatus of both countries 
in the longer run, as we find that both countries would decrease level of militarization 
while may still incur higher defence expenditures only at higher levels of GDP to 
import high end technology military imports much like developed nations who keep 
smaller but well equipped armies. Though, such long run scenario is based on the 
assumption that Kashmir dispute would be solved. 
May be a similar vision of economic and security prospects of peace have motivated 
Pakistani side to take current peace initiatives where President Musharraf had become 
the first Pakistani leader to show some flexibility in solving Kashmir dispute while 
showing willingness to set aside Pakistan’s traditional demand of plebiscite in Kashmir 
and Jammu region; a demand which has always been rejected by the Indian side for last 
30 years or so. Today Pakistan has proven to have made a genuine effort towards peace 
in the region where they have also decreased tariffs on number of Indian products. 
How ever how India has undermined Pakistani peace initiatives by its continuous 
lukewarm response is matter of another debate as it appears how international 
community fairs with Pakistan in future matter for Indian policy towards Pakistan a lot. 
In this context, it can be suggested that India is playing an old game where it is buying 
its time out of peace yet again as it did in 1970s when after East Pakistan debacle, India 
back tracked on its commitment over plebiscite in Kashmir and eventually won over 
the argument at least on international forums where now a days indeed any demand of 
self determination of a segment of Kashmiri population out of a economically 
prospering nation like India seems an unconvincing argument especially under an 
international economic wisdom which is in favour of globalisation. 
There is also evidence that Indian army doesn’t share the same enthusiasm as is shown 
by the government of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. For example early this 
year on 8 January 2007, Indian army by going against their government line came out in 
the local media strongly opposing any consideration by Indian side to the proposal put 
on table by Pakistan to administer Jammu and Kashmir in a joint management 
framework to further curtail down hostilities: 
“A spokesman of the Army here stressed that there could not be a joint management 
between a military dictator of Pakistan and a democracy like India. The spokesman 
described "joint management" as a "dangerous proposal" because it would dilute 
India's control on two-thirds of the original state of J and K. For the first time the 
Army has come out against the much-hyped proposal of Pakistan with the spokesman 
saying that Pakistan is toying with the idea of an "out-of-box" solution called "joint 
management" of the J and K state, but it was dangerous for India”1
1 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070110/j&k.htm#1
8Quite interestingly, on December 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asked both 
sides to forget about the past in favor for an optimistic future as he rightly realized that 
the destinies of both nations are intricately interconnected. A day before the statement 
came out, Pakistan decreased tariffs on a significant number of main Indian goods 
imported to the country, which could have easily been took as an indirect indication of 
giving India a status of most favored nation. It makes an insightful observation then that 
few days later in January 2007, Indian army leadership would undermine the whole 
atmosphere of peace building by an uncalled for press statement while also making a 
political comment by referring to the prevalent governance structure in Pakistan. This 
may suggest either lack of Indian sincerity towards peace building in the region or it may 
indicate that Indian army may have a Kashmir or Pakistan policy which is somewhat 
exogenous to what is being planned out in the Indian Prime Minister secretariat and thus 
seriously undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the Indian government to carry 
out its own foreign policy yet again questioning the fundamentals of Indian democracy. 
3. Cross Border Challenges for Post 2008 Democratic Pakistan
The tensions between India and Pakistan have been escalated amid global financial crises 
and relative plummeting of growth rates in both countries. Currently hostilities are at the 
highest for the last 15 years or so. The talk of surgical strikes within Pakistani borders is 
common talk across the border. Pakistan is maligned by India in international forums 
frequently and even at prime ministerial level. SAARC summit in Pakistan was cancelled 
last year due to the boycott of India. While the air of confrontation is happening actively 
from the Indian side, unrest in Indian held Kashmir has been at its peak not seen since 
the advent of 21st century. From the Pakistani side, the two successive democratic 
governments of Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz are trying 
hard to bring India to the negotiation table but with little success. A docile reaction to 
Indian war mongering has created many rifts between civil military relationships in 
Pakistan. The current geo political situation in South Asia is mired with uncertainty due 
to worsening Pakistan India relationship. As rightly pointed out by Murshed and 
Mamoon (2007), democratic orientation has a very limited role to play in bringing India 
and Pakistan closer to peace as suggested by the recent history of the subcontinent. If 
any, economic success on account of both countries would create an environment where 
India may respond to Pakistan’s peace initiatives. India has missed the 2006 peace train. 
The discussion in above sections and in light of Murshed and Mamoon (2007) analysis 
suggest that India has been trying to find ways out of peace. The only deterrence for 
Pakistan to extreme hostile action or high level of hostilities from across the border is a 
strong military posture from the Pakistani side. It is in Indian interest to weaken that 
posture to dominate regional politics and economics. The domestic political and social 
issues are a clear handicap of Pakistan to take up a road to sustainable and stable 
democratic path. Constant hostilities emanating from the Indian side is not helping the 
situation in favor of democratic governments of Pakistan. Such is the challenging 
situation despite a dovish stance of incumbent political party PML N towards India. This 
provides a circumstantial evidence that India has hijacked the peace within South Asia 
and is ready to miss opportunities of peaceful solutions to bilateral disputes in the future 
also.
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